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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ELUSIVE STANDARDS;
ELUSIVE REVIEW
ANNE BOWEN POULIN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Chaidez,I the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit opts for a flexible standard to determine whether a seizure more
intrusive than a stop but less intrusive than a full arrest comports with
the fourth amendment. Chaidez builds on the court's earlier decision in
Llaguno v. Mingey.2 In Llaguno, a plurality of the en banc court deter-
mined that the standard of probable cause is flexible, adjusting to the
severity of the offense.
In these two cases, the court is charting new territory. It has moved
beyond the rules established by the United States Supreme Court for
evaluating seizures of the person. The Supreme Court has established a
clear framework: seizures for the purpose of criminal investigation fall
into two categories, less intrusive seizures, which can be justified by rea-
sonable suspicion, 3 and seizures approaching arrest in their intrusiveness,
which require probable cause. 4 As employed by the Supreme Court, the
terms reasonable suspicion and probable cause are flexible but each
designates a determinable quantity of information; the Court does not
treat them as incapable of definition.5 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's
standards for determining whether a seizure is a stop or an arrest and
whether there is reasonable suspicion or probable cause have some
flexibility.
The Seventh Circuit appears to be injecting into fourth amendment
jurisprudence new extremes of flexibility in defining standards. Conced-
edly, there are not necessarily right and wrong standards under the
fourth amendment. The language of the amendment is general. 6 Courts
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. B.A., Radcliffe College; J.D., Uni-
versity of Maine; LL.M., University of Michigan. I thank my tireless research assistant, Barry
Gosin.
1. 919 F.2d 1195, 1196 (7th Cir. 1990).
2. 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985).
3. 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 9.2 and 9.3 (1985); CHARLES H. WHITE-
BREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, Criminal Procedure § 3.02 (1986).
4. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 5.1; WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, §§ 3.02 and 3.03.
5. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 3.2, 9.3; WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, § 3.03.
6. Amendment IV of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
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have had to determine the content of that general language and translate
the protection into specific standards governing specific governmental
conduct. Chaidez and Liaguno opt for flexible, sliding scale standards,
adaptable to the needs of the situation. These decisions therefore prompt
a discussion of the benefits and hazards of such standards.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reasons that the pres-
ent framework of analysis, based on defined standards, rests on artificial
distinctions and requires inappropriate pigeonholing. 7 Its new approach,
concludes the court, offers precision of analysis and of fourth amendment
protection. 8 Unfortunately, the new approach assaults fourth amend-
ment protection. Claiming to seek precision, the court threatens to im-
plement standards that reduce the effective protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The standards adopted in Chaidez
and Liaguno are so flexible that the protection they afford will be too
elusive to be effective.
Standards as flexible as those adopted in Chaidez and Liaguno pres-
ent a number of problems that reduce the effectiveness of fourth amend-
ment protection. First, they can be expected to reduce the consistency of
results. Second, such flexible standard provide a less effective guide to
the "on-the-street" conduct of the police. Third, they create increased
likelihood of injury to individual rights through error and abuse.
Fourth and last, more flexible standards are difficult to supervise.
Judicial supervision of fourth amendment rights has always been prob-
lematic. Increasing the flexibility of the governing standards compounds
the difficulty. At the same time, standard of review in fourth amend-
ment cases is being relaxed. 9 Even under the prevailing standard of re-
view, and certainly under a relaxed standard, the court may not ensure
that such flexible standards are enforced.
The court's action is particularly troublesome because it diminishes
fourth amendment protection against investigative detentions less intru-
sive than arrests. The police-individual encounters falling in this cate-
gory have a significant impact on daily life and affect the individual's
sense of personal security from arbitrary government intrusion. Yet the
mechanisms adopted by the Seventh Circuit for monitoring fourth
amendment intrusions are less likely than the traditional approach to be
effective means of supervising such encounters.
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
7. 919 F.2d at 1197-98.
8. 919 F.2d at 1198.
9. See Chaidez, 919 F.2d at 1196 (7th Cir. 1990). See discussion infra at notes 25, 42, and 43.
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II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT APPROACH
A. United States v. Chaidez '0
In Chaidez, after a period of surveillance, government agents seized
the defendants and asked defendant Silva for consent to search the house
recently visited by the defendants. When they searched, the agents found
a stash of drugs. The outcome of the defendants' motion to suppress
therefore turned on whether the detention of the defendant Silva leading
to the seizure of the drugs was reasonable under the fourth amendment. It
The court concluded that the seizure "was more intrusive than an ordi-
nary Terry stop."' 2 To seize the defendants, the agents used their cars to
block the defendants' two cars and then approached the defendants' cars
with their guns drawn. The agents then interrogated the defendants,
searched the cars, and obtained Silva's consent to search the house.
What did the agents know when they took this action? Acting on a
tip from a reliable informant that Chaidez was "large-scale heroin
dealer," the agents started surveillance of Chaidez at 8:30 a.m. Chaidez
left his house carrying a small plastic bag. He was driven to a restaurant,
where he picked up his car. Chaidez made brief stops, meeting his code-
fendants Chavira and Silva at one of his stops. After a brief conversation
with the two codefendants, they left in their car and Chaidez left in his
car, driving evasively. When Chaidez got off the expressway north, he
was rejoined by the codefendants in their car. All three went to a house,
where they stayed for half an hour. Chaidez had the plastic bag when he
entered the house, but was not carrying it when he left. The codefend-
ants left the house five minutes after Chaidez and met him in a parking
lot. After Chaidez made a phone call, the three got into their respective
cars and "drove off again at a high rate of speed."' 3 Their speed caused
the police to think the defendants had detected the surveillance, so they
stopped the defendants in the manner described above.14
The information on which the agents acted comfortably met and
even exceeded reasonable suspicion but did not amount to probable
cause. The Chaidez court therefore had to determine whether a seizure
10. 919 F.2d 1193 (7th Cir. 1990).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1198.
13. Id. at 1195.
14. Id. at 1195-96. The district court had held that the seizure was justified under Terry based
on reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1196. The Court of Appeals determined that the seizure was more
intrusive than "an ordinary Terry stop." Id. at 1198. The ensuing discussion reveals that the court
saw the information known to the agents as more than reasonable suspicion but less than probable
cause.
1991]
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more intrusive than a Terry 15 stop could be justified by less than prob-
able cause. The court concluded that it could.' 6 The Chaidez court re-
jected the argument that once a seizure exceeded a Terry stop, it must be
treated as an arrest requiring probable cause. 17 The court stated: [t]rying
to force a continuous world into two categories is not only impossible but
also unnecessary when the text of the Constitution calls for inquiry into
'reasonableness.' "18 The court adopted a "sliding scale approach to the
relation between the level of suspicion and the degree of intrusion."' 19
Judged on a sliding scale, the information known to the police was suffi-
cient to justify the fourth amendment seizure.
Chaidez injects additional flexibility into the already flexible analysis
of fourth amendment rights in "on-the-street" interactions. There was
already flexibility in the definition of a seizure and the line between a
Terry seizure and an arrest. In addition, the concept of reasonable suspi-
cion-the level of information that justifies a Terry seizure-is flexible.
Chaidez permits an extremely flexible analysis of seizures that are more
intrusive than Terry stops but still fall short of full-fledged arrests.
B. Llaguno v. Mingey20
Chaidez built on Llaguno v. Mingey2' in which the court also used a
sliding scale. In Llaguno, the court, sitting en banc, considered an appeal
from a judgment in favor of the police officer defendants in a civil suit.
The divided court ordered a new trial, but the plurality's discussion of
probable cause introduced the sliding scale concept further developed in
Chaidez. In Llaguno, the plurality adopted a standard for gauging prob-
able cause defined by balancing and, that consequently, was flexible.22
David Llaguno, the plaintiff, had been arrested and held for 42
hours without being charged before the police discovered that the killer
they sought was actually the plaintiff's brother. When they entered the
house, the police were seeking a killer who had fled on foot after the car
in which he was riding crashed. The entry was lawful only if the police
had probable cause to believe the killer was there. The killer was proba-
15. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the Court upheld a limited seizure of the person for
investigative inquiry. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 9.1.
16. 919 F.2d 1201.
17. Id. at 1197.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1199.
20. 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985).
21. Id.
22. Although Llaguno was a plurality decision, it has since been cited as standing for the appli-
cation of a sliding scale to probable cause determinations. See BeVier v. Hucal, 806 F.2d 123 (7th
Cir. 1986).
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bly Hispanic. The car from which he fled had not been reported stolen
and was registered to Vilma Llaguno 23 at the address of the challenged
entry, two miles from the crash site.
Among other questions, the court determined whether the police
had probable cause to enter the Llaguno house. Whether the entry of the
house was reasonable thus rested on the theory that the police had prob-
able cause to believe that the missing killer not only lived at the address
to which the car was registered but had traveled the two miles to the
house to seek refuge. 24
The plurality explained its view of probable cause in the following
words: "Probable cause-the area between bare suspicion and virtual
certainty-describes not a point but a zone, within which the graver the
crime the more latitude the police must be allowed."'25
The plurality concluded:
Given the gravity of the crimes they were investigating, the possibility
that there would be more shootings unless the killer was seized imme-
diately, and the information (limited as it was) that made it seem that
he might well have fled to the Llaguno home, we cannot say, as a mat-
ter of law, that the police did not have probable cause to enter and
search the house as they did.26
Thus, the plurality employed a flexible definition of probable cause, re-
quiring a greater quantity of information to search when the crime is less
serious and a lesser quantity when the crime is more serious.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF A FLEXIBLE STANDARD
Fourth amendment jurisprudence, particularly since Terry v. Ohio, 2 7
is confused. 28 At one time, analysis of government conduct proceeded
from the starting point that a seizure of the person normally required
probable cause and that the requirement of probable cause was subject
only to enumerated, defined exceptions. 29 However, the Supreme Court
23. It turned out that Vilma was the daughter-in-law of Gloria Llaguno, the mother of both the
plaintiff and the killer. 763 F.2d at 1563.
24. Id. at 1566.
25. Id. at 1565.
26. Id. at 1567.
27. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
28. See generally Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amend-
ment on the Street, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1990); Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in
the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173 (1988); Wayne R. LaFave, Being Frank About the Fourth: On Allen's "Process
of 'Factualization' in the Search and Seizure Cases", 85 MICH. L. REV. 427 (1987); George E. Dix,
Nonarrest Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DUKE L. J. 849 (1985); Richard-
son, Why the Fourth Amendment Doesn't Stand Still, 26 JuDGEs J. 48 (1987).
29. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 9.1.
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has recognized a number of exceptions to the probable cause require-
ment.30 It is therefore harder to argue that the standards assaulted by
the court in Chaidez and Llaguno are constitutionally mandated.
Chaidez evaluates the decisions since Terry and reads the Supreme
Court's willingness to recognize exceptions as a signal that the focus in
each case is the reasonableness of the government conduct, to be deter-
mined by a balancing test.
Nevertheless, even though the fourth amendment speaks of unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, it does not leave the courts to define what
is unreasonable with the latitude of a jury in a negligence action. 31 The
core of the fourth amendment is the preference for warrants in most in-
stances and the requirement of probable cause to justify most fourth
amendment intrusions. The Supreme Court has recognized exceptions
only when the circumstances of a specific situation called for a departure
from the general rule.32 The development of the law does not invite the
courts to apply a case by case sliding scale balancing test.
Terry cited Camara v. Municipal Court 33 as the source of its balanc-
ing test.34 In Camara, the Court considered the constitutionality of war-
rantless city housing inspections.35 The Court reaffirmed the fourth
amendment's preference for warrants but determined that probable
cause, or reasonableness, should be determined by "balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails."13 6 The Court con-
cluded that "the area inspection is a 'reasonable' search of private prop-
erty within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment" 37 and that
" 'probable cause' to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection
are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling."38 Thus, Camara es-
tablished both the balancing test for gauging fourth amendment rights
and the method of assessing the fourth amendment implications of ad-
ministrative searches.
Terry did not involve an administrative search. The stop and frisk
in Terry rested on particularized suspicion of the defendants. Terry nev-
30. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, § 3.02.
31. Llaguno, 763 F.2d at 1564. Interestingly, in Liaguno, the majority cited United States v.
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.), a famous negligence case, to assist its
discussion of when a warrantless search is constitutional.
32. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, § 3.02.
33. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
34. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
35. Camara, 387 U.S. at 525.
36. Id. at 537.
37. Id. at 538.
38. Id.
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ELUSIVE STANDARDS; ELUSIVE REVIEW
ertheless adopted Camara's analytical approach as the framework of
analysis for some fourth amendment questions even where no warrant
was required and the police were conducting criminal investigation based
on particularized suspicion. In Terry, the Court identified "the central
inquiry under the Fourth Amendment-the reasonableness in all the cir-
cumstances of the particular government invasion of a citizen's personal
security."' 39 Terry applied the balancing test to permit a stop and frisk on
less than probable cause; it did not invite ad hoc balancing in every case.
The result of Terry's balancing is that reasonable suspicion, which is a
standard less than probable cause, is sufficient to support a stop and frisk,
which is an intrusion less than an arrest and full search. The task of
defining when the lower standard will suffice and what the lower stan-
dard is was left for later cases.
In Terry, the Court committed itself to some balancing to determine
the permissible boundaries in police-citizen interaction. The Court, how-
ever, continued to limit the situations in which the balancing test, rather
than the straightforward probable cause requirement, would be applied.
For example, in Dunaway v. New York,4° the Court rejected the state's
argument for a sliding scale approach. The Court stated:
[T]he protections intended by the Framers could all too easily disap-
pear in the consideration and balancing of the multifarious circum-
stances presented by different cases, especially when that balancing
may be done in the 'often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime'. . . A single familiar standard is essential to guide police of-
ficers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and bal-
ance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront.41
Since Dunaway, however, the Court has recognized numerous ex-
ceptions to the probable cause requirement.42 In Chaidez, the court cata-
logued the decisions of the Supreme Court permitting searches and
seizures on less than probable cause.43 The question is: How far have the
courts moved from Dunaway? The answer given by Chaidez and
39. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
40. 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
41. Id. at 213-14.
42. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 3; WHITEBREAD & SLOROGIN, supra note 3; Matthew F.
Bogdanos, Search and Seizure: A Reasoned Approach, 6 PACE L. REV. 543, 561-86 (1986); Edwin
Butterfoss, As time Goes By: The Elimination of Contemporaneity and Brevity in Search and Seizure
Cases, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 603 (1986).
43. Chaidez, 919 F.2d at 1196-97. The Chaidez court noted that in the following situations the
Court upheld the constitutionality of a search or seizure notwithstanding the absence of probable
cause or a warrant: (1) administrative searches, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967);
(2) inventory searches, see South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 346, 369-76 (1976); (3) drug-testing
programs, see National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); and (4)
searches incident to arrest, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
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Llaguno is "quite far." To the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
the Supreme Court's decisions signal that the appropriate focus is now on
the general question of reasonableness.
While the Court has applied balancing to a number of situations
since Dunaway, the Court of Appeals has exaggerated the Court's will-
ingness to balance in determining fourth amendment rights. The cases
relied upon by the Chaidez court reflect willingness to engage in "one
time only" balancing to determine the appropriate fourth amendment
rules for particular situations. The cases do not reflect willingness to
engage in the type of ad hoc balancing called for by Chaidez." They are
not sprinkled along a continuum.
Instead, the decisions represent specific balances struck for specific
types of situations. In several of the cases cited in Chaidez, the Supreme
Court recognized that the government has strong interests that support
specific types of administrative searches: inspections to enforce health
and safety codes;45 inventory searches of seized property;46 and drug test-
ing of government employees in certain types of positions.47 Similar
analysis led the Court to approve drunk driving road blocks. 4 In other
cases, the Court held that in specific settings-schools 49 and interna-
tional border areas 5 -the fourth amendment balance between the au-
thority of the government and the rights of the individual is weighted
toward the government and the standards for government action are
commensurately less exacting.
A close reading of the decisions reveals the error of the Chaidez
court's conclusion. In Hayes v. Florida,51 the Court adhered to the rec-
ognition of the line between Terry stops and arrest: "There is no doubt
that at some point in the investigative process, police procedures can
qualitatively and quantitatively be so intrusive with respect to a suspect's
freedom of movement and privacy interests as to trigger the full protec-
tion of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. '52 The Hayes Court
did not define that line with precision. It suggested that reasonable suspi-
cion can justify fingerprinting on the street, if "carried out with dis-
44. See generally Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as
Constitutional Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19 (1988).
45. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
46. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
47. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
48. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
49. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 324, 341 (1985).
50. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879-80 (1975).
51. 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
52. Id. at 816.
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patch," 53 but "forcibly remov[ing] a person from his home or other place
in which he is entitled to be and transport[ing] him to the police station,
where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes" re-
quires probable cause. 54 Thus, the Court reaffirmed the basic division
between stops and arrests.
In United States v. Montoya de Hernandez,55 the Court declined to
adopt a standard in addition to reasonable suspicion and probable cause
and did not engage in ad hoc balancing. Instead, the Court determined
the appropriate balance of individual-government interests at the border,
where "the Fourth Amendment's balance of reasonableness is qualita-
tively different."' 56 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had
adopted a "clear indication"5 7 standard for a non-routine border seizure.
The court of appeals used "clear indication". "as an intermediate stan-
dard between 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause.' -58 The Court
stated:
We do not think that the Fourth Amendment's emphasis upon reason-
ableness is consistent with the creation of a third verbal standard in
addition to "reasonable suspicion" and "probable cause"; we are deal-
ing with a constitutional requirement of reasonableness.., and subtle
verbal gradations may obscure rather than elucidate the meaning of
the provision in question.59
What does Montoya de Hernandez suggest for the question in
Chaidez? The Court in Montoya de Hernandez opted for neither a new
standard nor an ad hoc balancing test. Montoya de Hernandez represents
a one-time assessment of the appropriate fourth amendment balance; it
does not evidence willingness to balance on a case by case basis. The
Court treated "reasonable suspicion" as a defined standard6° and held it
was sufficient to justify border detention beyond what was routine. In
Montoya de Hernandez, the detention went well beyond a Terry deten-
tion.61 The Court did not treat reasonable suspicion as a flexible stan-
dard that could "float up" to sustain an intrusion as extreme as this one.
53. Id. at 817.
54. Id. at 816.
55. 473 U.S. 523 (1985).
56. Id. at 538.
57. Id. at 536.
58. Id. at 540.
59. Id. at 541.
60. The Court stated: "Under this standard officials at the border must have a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting the particular person of alimentary canal smuggling." Id. at 541-
42.
61. Montoya de Hernandez was held for almost 24 hours before she was finally searched pursu-
ant to a warrant, which had been sought only after 16 hours of her detention.
1991]
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It concluded that reasonable suspicion justified this intrusion because of
the balance of interests at the border.
Similarly, in United States v. Sokolow 62 the Court discussed reason-
able suspicion as a defined standard. The Court stated:
That level of suspicion is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing
by a preponderance of the evidence. We have held that probable cause
means a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found. . . , and the level of suspicion required for a Terry stop is obvi-
ously less demanding than that for probable cause.63
The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's effort to mechanize the assess-
ment of reasonable suspicion, but it did not treat reasonable suspicion as
a wholly flexible standard.
Thus, although the Court has adopted more flexible standards for
determining fourth amendment questions, it has resisted efforts to insti-
tute a test as flexible as that adopted in Chaidez. It has continued to
work within the basic framework established by Terry, distinguishing be-
tween less intrusive seizures that require reasonable suspicion, and more
intrusive seizures that require probable cause.
IV. THE FLEXIBLE STANDARD
A number of arguments support a flexible standard. Arguably, a
flexible standard defines constitutional boundaries most precisely. It can
adapt to the variety of fact situations that arise and must be resolved. It
does not hamper the police with an arbitrary and ill-fitting rule. On the
other hand, a flexible standard arguably presents disadvantages. It may
provide elusive protection, giving too little guidance to courts and police.
If outcomes cannot be predicted from case to case, the standard cannot
give adequate protection. This section of the Article discusses the
strengths and weaknesses of a flexible standard.
A. Elusive or Precise?
The Chaidez court reasoned that its sliding scale provides a better
definition of fourth amendment rights than a test that sorts conduct into
one of a few categories, each governed by a particular rule. The standard
adopted in Chaidez is arguably a more precise definition and offers more
precise protection of fourth amendment rights.
If all seizure cases are sorted into two categories, many will fit badly.
A fixed rule cannot contemplate and accommodate the broad range of
62. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
63. Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
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police-individual interactions. In the Chaidez court's view, the estab-
lished rules prohibit government conduct that more precisely tailored
fourth amendment rules would permit. 64 Therefore, the fixed rule gener-
ates "near miss" cases, in which the conclusion that the police action
violated fourth amendment rights will be distasteful. The Chaidez court
suggests that courts have reacted to such distaste by stretching the inflex-
ible rule to fit the case.65 The court reasons that the resulting decisions
both deprive the rule of its intended significance and resolve difficult
cases without candidly evaluating the fourth amendment issues in light
of the governing principles rather than the ill-fitting rule.66
Certainly, the attempt to define bright line rules to guide fourth
amendment analysis poses problems. 67 A bright line rule necessarily cuts
too broad a swath. In some instances, the bright line permits govern-
ment conduct that the general standard, precisely applied, would not.68
For example, the rule in New York v. Belton,69 which authorized the po-
lice to search the entire interior of a car when they arrest a recent occu-
pant of the car, permits searches that cannot be justified under the more
general rule permitting searches incident to arrest.70 Under Belton, the
police can search areas of the car outside the grabbing distance of the
arrestee. 71 The bright line rule thus relieves the police of judgment calls
64. United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1195, 1197-98.
65. The court stated: "[b]oth the permissible reasons for a stop and search and the permissible
scope of the intrusion have expanded beyond their original contours in order to permit reasonable
police action when probable cause is arguably lacking." Chaidez, 919 F.2d at 1998.
66. The court stated: "Trying to force a continuous world into two categories is not only impos-
sible but also unnecessary when the text of the Constitution calls for an inquiry into 'reasonable-
ness'." Id. at 1197.
67. See generally LaFave, Being Frank, supra note 28.
68. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981) (Court held that detention of persons
at the scene of a search warrant is permissible incident to the execution of that warrant if (1) those
persons are "occupants" and (2) the warrant authorizes a "search for contraband" rather than a
"search for evidence"); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (Court concluded that "a
police officer's determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect whom he has
arrested is a quick ad hoc judgment which the fourth amendment does not require to be broken
down in each instance into an analysis of each step in the search.") See also Wayne R. LaFave,
"Case-by-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures'" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup.
CT. REV. 127 (1974).
69. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
70. See generally LaFave, Being Frank, supra note 28.
71. See United States v. Karlin, 852 F.2d 968, 972 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding search incident to
arrest of automobile's passenger compartment even though defendant had already been handcuffed
and placed in a squad car); United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding
search incident to arrest of automobile's passenger compartment even though defendant, who was a
recent occupant of the automobile, had already been transported to the police station); see also
United States v. Pino, 855 F.2d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 1988) (upholding search of rear section of mid-
sized station wagon); United States v. Russell 670 F.2d 323, 327 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457
U.S. 1108 (1990) (upholding search of hatchback).
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about where to search when they arrest an occupant of a car but does so
at the expense of fourth amendment protection.
In other instances, the bright line rule prohibits as unconstitutional
government conduct that would be approved under the general standard.
The clearest example in this category-Miranda v. Arizona 72-ies
outside the fourth amendment. Miranda enforces the fifth amendment
by excluding statements taken without compliance with fixed procedures.
Miranda excludes statements even if the defendant was not actually
coerced. 73
In Chaidez, the court reacted to its perception that categorizing in-
vestigative seizures into Terry seizures and arrests, with no middle
ground, results in both types of problems. The court remarked:
"[p]igeonholing is not boon for defendants: it has put considerable pres-
sure on the limits of the Terry doctrine."' 74 It later noted that its ap-
proach would protect fourth amendment interests "without hampering
reasonable investigative techniques by the police."' 75
Chaidez does not necessarily solve this problem. On one hand, it
relieves pressure to expand Terry by succumbing to that pressure and
giving greater latitude to the government. Under Chaidez the police can
engage in more intrusive conduct without facing a probable cause re-
quirement. On the other hand, it subjects the police to the risk of judicial
second guessing. Rather than being told specifically what investigative
techniques are reasonable, the police will learn case by case.
Another argument made in favor of Chaidez is that the more
broadly defined standard also keeps the focus on the rationale for the
protection, whereas application of a fixed rule may degenerate into
parsing the language of the rule.76 Some fixed rules have generated such
problems. For example, the Supreme Court developed rules for evaluat-
ing probable cause in Aguilar v. Texas 77 and Spinelli v. United States,78
72. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
73. WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, § 16.06.
74. Chaidez, 919 F.2d at 1198.
75. Id.
76. The development of the law of interrogation after Miranda v. Arizona was decided illus-
trates this phenomenon. The post-Miranda cases dwell on the definitions of custody and interroga-
tion and do not discuss the impact of the procedures employed on the suspect. See generally WAYNE
R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §§ 6.5-6.10 (1985); WHITEBREAD &
SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, §§ 16.04-16.08.
77. 378 U.S. 109 (1964) (Court developed a two-prong test to determine whether probable
cause existed where government agents relied upon an informant's tip to obtain a search warrant; the
first prong evaluated the veracity of the informant's tip by assessing the underlying circumstances
that formed the basis of the informant's conclusions and the second prong focused on the inform-
ant's reliability).
78. 393 U.S. 410 (1968) (re-affirming the Aguilar two-prong test).
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but abandoned them in Illinois v. Gates.79 The Court concluded in Gates
that the rules had dominated discussion and distracted the courts from
the underlying question of whether the information presented was suffi-
cient for probable cause.80 Focusing on the standard rather than specific
rules interpreting the standard avoids this problem. 81 However, the area
of the law which Chaidez addresses is not plagued by over-precise rules.
In interpreting Terry the courts have resisted pressure to adopt per se
rules. 82
A flexible "reasonableness" standard, moreover, does not necessar-
ily lead to precise and unbiased assessment of fourth amendment inter-
ests.8 3 The Chaidez standard assumes levels of suspicion fall along a
continuum between reasonable suspicion and probable cause. Defining
intermediate levels of suspicion falling between reasonable suspicion and
probable cause is extremely difficult. 84
Moreover, the influence of cases decided under the old standard will
skew the development of fourth amendment law under a flexible stan-
dard. Under the old standard, the courts apply Terry to encounters in
which the police impose significant restraints on the individual. Cases
decided under the old standard already occupy positions on the contin-
uum. A court applying a flexible standard will refer to those cases as
guides. For example, the courts have held in numerous cases that inves-
tigative detentions at gun point were Terry stops and could therefore be
79. 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (holding that the test is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed).
80. The court concluded:
We agree... that an informant's veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge are all highly
relevant in determining the value of his report. We do not agree, however, that these
elements should be understood as entirely separate and independent requirements to be
rigidly exacted in every case. Rather, . . . they should be understood simply as closely
intertwined issues that may usefully illuminate the.., practical question whether there is
"probable cause" to believe that contraband or evidence is located in a particular place.
Id. at 230.
81. See also Morgan Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: the Drug Courier Profile and
Judicial Review of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843 (1985).
82. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 9.2.
83. In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 765 (1969), the Court commented as follows on the
hazards of a "reasonableness" test:
It is argued in the present case that it is "reasonable" to search a man's house when he is
arrested in it. But that argument is founded on little more than a subjective view regarding
the acceptability of certain sorts of police conduct, and not on considerations relevant to
Fourth Amendment interests. Under such an unconfined analysis, Fourth Amendment
protection in this area would approach the evaporation point.
84. See Tracey Maclin, Seeing the Constitution From the Backseat of a Police Squad Car (book
review), 70 B.U. L. REV. 543, 564 (1990); Maclin, Decline of the Right of Locomotion, supra note 28;
see also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 ("subtle verbal gradations may
obscure rather than elucidate the meaning of the provision in question").
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justified by a showing of reasonable suspicion.85 Under a new, flexible
standard, comparable encounters are likely to be upheld easily on the
basis of reasonable suspicion, since they fall within the established zone
of government behavior authorized under Terry. The new rule's flexibil-
ity is likely to be employed for those situations in which the intrusion is
more extreme than any authorized under Terry, but the police do not
have the probable cause required for an arrest. The government can in-
voke the flexible rule to uphold such intrusions on some justification fall-
ing between reasonable suspicion and probable cause.
Looking in the other direction, the government may also invoke the
flexible rule to uphold fourth amendment intrusions not supported even
by reasonable suspicion. The government can argue, moving down the
continuum, that a very limited seizure is less than a Terry stop and is
justified even in the absence of reasonable suspicion. Thus, the move-
ment encouraged by the rule enlarges the government's authority to im-
pose restrictions on individual fourth amendment rights.
Similarly, Llaguno encourages a more relaxed definition of probable
cause that authorizes government action on less information in serious
cases. It is possible, but less likely, that it would be invoked to require a
higher quantity of evidence to support government action in less serious
cases.
In addition, a reasonableness test is likely to be biased in favor of the
judgment exercised by the police.86 The court deciding a case will view
the actions through the eyes of the police and ask whether, from that
vantage point, the actions were reasonable. The information on which
the decision rests is predominantly police testimony given at the suppres-
sion hearing. The individual complaining of a fourth amendment viola-
tion will testify far less often.8 7 The crucial question is what the police
knew; the perspective of the complaining individual is not determinative.
B. Consistency Versus Flexibility
Arguably, the flexibility of the Chaidez rule is an attractive fea-
85. See supra notes 45, 48, and 58 and accompanying text.
86. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981); see generally Maclin, Decline of the Right
of Locomotion, supra note 28, at 1303-08; Strossen, supra note 28; Herman Schwartz, Stop and Frisk
(A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Scl. 433,
449 (1967); Matthew Lippman, Stop and Frisk: The Triumph of Law Enforcement Over Private
Rights, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 24 (1988). See also Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
87. The majority of cases are decided on the basis of testimony given at the suppression hearing
held before a criminal trial.
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ture.88 On the other hand, a fixed rule arguably fosters consistency and
uniformity in the protection of the constitutional interests involved. Gui-
dance in fourth amendment law is difficult to achieve because the deci-
sions are fact specific. Nevertheless, guidance will be more effective if the
rules are well defined.89
The Seventh Circuit is moving to rules that are fact specific in the
extreme, making consistency of result unlikely.9° This move is unwise
and unnecessary. Courts can analyze cases effectively and adequately
within the framework of the existing rules. The line between a stop and
an arrest is already drawn with some flexibility. The court acknowledged
that flexibility in United States v. Serna-Barreto,91 when it stated:
The distinction between a stop and an arrest is one of degree, so it is
not surprising that the courts have had difficulty in coming up with a
bright-line test. Instead, they have tended to follow the laundry-list
approach, well illustrated by the list (not exhaustive) of factors (all
relevant, none decisive, and no indication of how to weigh or compare
them) in United States v. White ... : officer's intent, impression con-
veyed, length of stop, questions asked, search made.92
Indeed, the Chaidez court was misled by a similar discussion of that
flexibility in United States v. Quinn 93 and cited it as advocating a sliding
scale test like the one Chaidez adopted. 94 In Quinn, the Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit recognized the flexibility in the test for the line be-
tween stops and arrests:
No mechanical checklist has been assembled to facilitate distinguishing
between such investigative stops, on the one hand, and those deten-
tions, on the other, which, though not technical, formal arrests are the
"equivalent of an arrest" and therefore require probable cause....
Rather the cases have used a balancing test to assess these intrusions,
weighing "the limited violation of the individual's privacy against the
opposing interests in crime prevention and detection and in the police
officer's safety. 9 5
Thus, Quinn did no more than acknowledge and apply the flexible test
developed under Terry.
Applying the standards for distinguishing stops and arrests, the
88. United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1195, 1196 (7th Cir. 1990). See generally Wasserstrom
& Seidman, supra note 44.
89. See generally William A. Schroeder, Factoring the Seriousness of the Offense into Fourth
Amendment Equations, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 439 (1990).
90. See Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 44, at 48.
91. 842 F.2d 965 (7th Cir. 1988).
92. Id. at 967. See also Dix, supra note 28, for a general discussion of criteria for classifying
seizures.
93. 815 F.2d 153 (1st Cir. 1987).
94. Chaidez, 919 F.2d at 1198.
95. 815 F.2d at 156.
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courts have derived reasonably consistent results. Decisions evaluating
police use of guns to effect stops illustrate the courts' ability to work with
the existing rules. In a number of cases, the police have used their fire-
arms to seize a suspect and have contended in court that the seizure did
not rise to the level of an arrest but remained a stop, justifiable by reason-
able suspicion.96 The question for the courts has been whether the "man-
ner of the stop .. .convert[ed] the investigatory stop into an arrest,"
requiring probable cause. 97 The courts have rejected a per se rule, stating
"a Terry stop does not become an arrest merely because an officer
pointed a gun at a suspect."98 The courts have therefore looked to a
number of factors, including the nature of the crime, the degree of suspi-
cion, the location of the stop, the time of day and the reaction of the
suspect to the police.99 In most of the decisions addressing this question,
the courts have determined that, under the circumstances, the police
could use the challenged degree of force to effect the stop. 1°° In a few
cases, the courts have held that the force exceeded that permitted for a
stop and the police had effected an arrest. 10 1
The cases illustrate the consistency of result achieved under the ex-
isting standards. They also illustrate the flexibility inherent in determin-
ing the line between a Terry stop and an arrest. That flexibility provides
room to deal with the factual variations of new circumstances but does
not provide so much room that it defeats consistency. 0 2 In United States
v. Ocampo,10 3 for example, the Seventh Circuit determined, even though
he used his gun, the officer had not transformed the investigative stop, for
which he had adequate justification, into an arrest, for which he did
not. 10 4 In Ocampo, the officer drew his gun as he approached the defend-
ant's car, removed the defendant from the car, and retrieved a gun that
the defendant had kicked under the passenger's seat. '0 5 The court stated:
96. See cases cited infra notes 97 and 98.
97. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 899 F.2d 833, 839 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
671 (1991).
98. See United States v. Ocampo, 890 F.2d 1363, 1369 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Trullo,
809 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916 (1988); United States v. Eisenberg, 807 F.2d
1446, 1451 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Hardnett, 804 F.2d 353, 357 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1097 (1987).
99. Ocampo, 890 F.2d at 1369.
100. See United States v. Lane, 909 F.2d 895, 900 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 977
(1991); Alvarez, 899 F.2d at 838-39; Serna-Barreto, 842 F.2d at 967-68; see also, cases cited in
LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 9.2.
101. See United States v. Del Vizo, 918 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Delgadillo-
Velasquez, 856 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1988).
102. See generally WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 3, § 9.03.
103. 890 F.2d 1363 (7th Cir. 1989).
104. Id. at 1367.
105. Id. at 1366.
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"[T]he question of whether a seizure is an investigatory stop or an arrest
involves the determination of whether the degree of intrusion into the
suspect's personal security was reasonably related in scope to the circum-
stances at hand."' 0 6 The court acknowledged that the officer's show of
force would have been "tantamount to an arrest" in some cases, but held
that under the circumstances it was warranted. 107 Therefore, the initial
interaction did not amount to an arrest.
Ocampo recognized flexibility in the line between a Terry stop and
an arrest. Its approach treats the justification as a factor in selecting the
appropriate standard. That is, because the circumstances justified more
intrusive action, the court judges the action as a Terry stop rather than
an arrest.
In United States v. Novak, 08 the court evaluated the factors and
concluded that the purported stop had become an arrest. In Novak, the
defendant was stopped by 6 to 9 law enforcement officers, one of whom
drew her gun on the defendant. The officers had no information sug-
gesting the defendant was dangerous and nothing in the defendant's reac-
tion to the officers signalled danger.1t 9
The flexibility reflected in these and other cases permits the courts to
assess the appropriateness of the behavior justified by reasonable suspi-
cion with consistency. It does not launch the courts into a case by case
balancing test to determine whether the level of suspicion was high
enough to support the action taken, even if that action went beyond the
temporary interference permitted by the Terry line of cases. The courts
would be unlikely to achieve consistency applying such a flexible rule.
C A Guide to On-the-Street Behavior?
Whether the courts choose a flexible standard or a more defined
standard will depend on how the court views the role and effectiveness of
rules defining fourth amendment protection. If the court intends fourth
amendment rules to guide and influence police behavior, the court will
try to define the rule in terms that a law enforcement officer can hope to
understand and apply with some degree of accuracy. On the other hand,
106. Id. at 1369.
107. The court stated: "The nature of the crime under investigation, the degree of suspicion, the
location of the stop, the time of day and the reaction of the suspect to the approach of the police are
all facts which bear on the issue of reasonableness." Id. at 1369. The court then concluded: "In
sum, after analyzing all the circumstances surrounding the seizure of the defendants, we do not find
the officer's conduct so intrusive and unreasonable as to constitute an arrest; the officer's actions
were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances at hand." Id. at 1370.
108. 870 F.2d 1345 (7th Cir. 1989).
109. Id. at 1351.
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if the court intends the rules to provide an after-the-fact mechanism for
protecting fourth amendment rights, the court will be satisfied if the rule
is suitable for judicial application, even if the rule provides little guidance
to law enforcement officers.
Fourth amendment rules should partake of both characters. The
courts must define the rules to effect the purpose of the fourth amend-
ment. That purpose includes limiting intrusive governmental conduct.
A rule that provides no guidance to on-the-street behavior cannot effec-
tively restrict unconstitutional governmental conduct."10
The current standards arguably provide so little guidance that mov-
ing to standards as general as those articulated in Chaidez and Llaguno
sacrifices nothing. The standards defined by Terry have been criticized as
too vague."' It has been argued that both the definition of reasonable
suspicion and the distinction between an arrest and a Terry stop give
inadequate guidance to on the street conduct."12 Persuaded by that argu-
ment, the Chaidez court concluded that it would sacrifice nothing of
value if it abandoned the pretended precision of the existing rules and
adopted a less well defined rule that more precisely reflects an appropri-
ate state-individual balance.
The courts have often expressed their awareness that fourth amend-
ment rules must guide the police. The Supreme Court has addressed the
question of how effectively fourth amendment law translates into a guide
for police behavior.' 3 To a great extent, fourth amendment law has de-
veloped in the context of the exclusionary rule intended as a deterrent to
unconstitutional behavior. The Court's concern has sometimes been not
whether the police can understand the fourth amendment rule, but
whether the exclusionary rule will induce them to follow the rule. In
Terry, the Court stated: "[the exclusionary rule] is powerless to deter
invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either
have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecu-
tion in the interest of serving some other goal." '" 4 The courts should not
dilute the definition of fourth amendment rights to accommodate their
110. See LaFave, The Robinson Dilemma, supra note 68, at 141. Other, non-constitutional limi-
tations on police conduct exist, but are beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Dix, supra
note 28.
111. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 9.3(a), at 423-29; Maclin, Decline of the Right of
Locomotion, supra note 28; Dix, supra note 28; Schwartz, supra note 86, at 449.
112. LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 9.1.
113. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
114. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14. See generally J. DAVID HIRSCHEL, FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
(1979) (discussing remedies for fourth amendment violations); Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493 (1955) (discussing need for remedies to sup-
plement the exclusionary rule).
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limited power to prompt police observance of fourth amendment rights.
Rather, the courts should define the rule to give some guidance. If the
rule is well-defined, the retrospective decision that the police, however
well intentioned, failed to comply may serve to guide future action.
In some circumstances, the Supreme Court has adopted bright line
rules to permit easy application on the street, as well as to ease the
courts' administrative burden. I 5 Unfortunately, bright line rules are not
wholly satisfactory. A bright line rule will either over-restrict the police
or under-protect the affected fourth amendment interest.' 1 6 In addition,
even if courts can use bright line rules to guide the police in some situa-
tions, the courts cannot craft a bright line rule for every fourth amend-
ment question.
Even when a bright line rule is inappropriate, however, the fourth
amendment standard will normally provide some on-the-street guidance.
When the courts apply a non-bright line rule to specific factual situa-
tions, their decisions illustrate the rule's intended role and increase its
impact on police behavior. "7 The abstract articulation of the standard is
unlikely to be helpful to the police."" Judicial decisions provide more
effective illustrations if the courts tie the illustrations to specifically ar-
ticulated rules.
At this point, the courts' decisions applying Terry provide some gui-
dance to the police.' ' 9 Chaidez enunciates a standard that would less
effectively guide on the street conduct. The more general the standard
applied in the decisions, the less guidance they provide. A standard that
requires the courts to determine reasonableness by balancing the degree
of the intrusion and the level of suspicion requires police to engage in the
same balancing. On-the-street balancing, however, is a difficult task. 20
The investigating officer who wants to go beyond a Terry stop is asked to
115. See generally LaFave, Being Frank, supra note 28, at 449-51; LAFAVE, supra note 3;
WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 3.
116. See supra notes 45 and 58 and accompanying text.
117. But see RICHARD H. UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 77 (1988) (discussing the confusion of the
police concerning the boundaries of the fourth amendment).
118. See LAFAVE, supra note 3. See also HIRSCHEL, supra note 114 (discussing understanding
of applications of fourth amendment rules); UVILLER, supra note 117 (recounting instances in which
the police reflected misunderstanding of fourth amendment law).
It is hard to measure the impact of rules on those responsible for applying them. Psychological
studies give insight into the effectiveness of various legal standards. For example, research reveals
that juries apply the standard of proof most effectively when it is defined in precise quantitative
terms rather than simply in legal terms or a colloquial version of legal terms. See Kagehiro, Defining
the Standard of Proof in Jury Instructions, 1 PSYCHO. ScI. 194 (1990).
119. It is nevertheless clear that the police can be confused about the law. See generally, UVIL-
LER, supra note 117; HIRSCHEL, supra note 118.
120. See generally Schroeder, supra note 89.
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determine whether her level of suspicion warrants the intrusion. She
must consider factors such as the severity of the offense, the weight of the
information justifying the action, and the extent to which her action ex-
ceeds a Terry stop. She must then ask whether the combination of fac-
tors falls on the continuum of justified actions between Terry stops and
arrests.
The Chaidez approach envisions too broad a scale and too flexible a
test. The judicial decisions would merely balance the facts of each case
and place the outcome of the balancing on a broad continuum. The illus-
trations would be too fact-specific to guide governmental conduct.1 21
D. Impact on "the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion
by the police"'122
For a number of reasons, the flexible approach of the Seventh Cir-
cuit will lead to diminished protection in practice. A flexible rule may be
academically defensible yet destroy constitutional protection through its
practical application. One persistent argument for simpler and brighter
line rules is that they provide better guidance for the law enforcement
officers principally responsible for respecting fourth amendment rights.
Rules that tell the government that an intrusion at the level of an arrest
requires probable cause and lesser intrusions require reasonable suspicion
is not as clear as a rule authorizing the police to conduct a thorough
search of the person of any individual arrested. Nevertheless, it gives
some guidance. It tells the police that their cases will be sorted into two
categories. Therefore, they must watch the degree of intrusion and the
degree of justification and must not impose arrest-type restrictions unless
they have probable cause to arrest.
A flexible standard gives no direction. It simply leaves the police to
exercise their best judgment of what intrusion is justified by the informa-
tion they possess and lets them know that the court will consider all the
circumstances and evaluate the reasonableness of their conduct.' 23
The police actions governed by Chaidez pose acute risks to fourth
amendment interests. Police actions that fall short of arrest but never-
theless reflect criminal investigative action pose particular problems.
These interactions represent the middle range of fourth amendment ac-
tivity, where the exercise of discretion by the police may profoundly af-
121. See generally Maclin, Decline of the Right of Locomotion, supra note 28 (discussing the
problems of standards that are too fact specific); LaFave, Being Frank, supra note 28.
122. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
123. See generally Schroeder, supra note 89.
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fect the individual's sense of freedom from arbitrary intrusion on privacy.
Although less than an arrest, a Terry type action represents an intrusive
disruption of the flow of daily life in circumstances in which the individ-
ual will be regarded as and treated as a criminal. 124 Evaluating these
interactions under a general formula on a case by case basis enhances
those risks by leaving too much to police discretion.
The intrusions that generate civil action may best illustrate the in-
trusiveness of the government action. Occasionally, a plaintiff will sue
for a fairly short detention.1 25 More often, the cases rest on allegations of
arrest or excessive force. 126 Some fall in between. Buffkins v. City of
Omaha 127 and James v. Sadler128 demonstrate the impact of police inves-
tigation on the individual. Buffkins arrived at the Omaha airport and
was met by her sisters. She caught the attention of two police officers
because she was the only black person who got off the plane and because
she carried a teddy bear that appeared to have resewn seams. The of-
ficers had received a tip that "a black person or persons arriving on a
flight from Denver" before 5:00 would be importing cocaine into
Omaha.129 Therefore, one officer approached Buffkins. After identifying
himself and showing her the identification she requested, he asked
Bufikins "to bring her luggage and come with them to answer ques-
tions."' 130 They told her sister she could leave. In addition, they in-
formed Buffkins of the tip that had prompted their action. They then
took her luggage and escorted Buffkins and her sister to their office on
the other side of the terminal. One officer "kneaded and felt" the teddy
bear. 131 They asked to search her luggage. She refused. "The officers
eventually informed Buffkins that she was free to go and told her to 'have
a nice day.' "132
In James, the plaintiff, a minor, was at the beauty salon having her
hair done when agents of the Bureau of Narcotics raided the salon. With
a permanent wave solution on her hair and curlers in her hair, plaintiff
was taken from under a hair dryer, patted down and instructed to wait
124. For an example of the intrusiveness of investigative action, see Bufikins v. City of Omaha,
922 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1990). See generally Maclin, Book Review, supra note 84; Maclin, Decline of
the Right of Locomotion, supra note 28.
125. See, e.g., Brooks v. Cook, 874 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1989).
126. See generally SHELDON NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION (2d
ed. 1986).
127. 922 F.2d 465 (8th Cir. 1990).
128. 909 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1990).
129. 922 F.2d at 467.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Based on her response to this, the officers arrested Buffkins for disorderly conduct.
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outside while the search of the salon proceeded. After 40 minutes, she
was permitted to leave. By the time she reached home and rinsed her
hair, the chemicals in the solution had already damaged her scalp.133
Both Bufjfkins and James illustrate that an intrusion less than an
arrest can cause significant harm to fourth amendment interests. Two
fourth amendment concerns are acute in this context--erroneous intru-
sion and abusive exercise of governmental authority. First, seizures less
intrusive than arrest represent a category of police-individual contact in
which errors are likely to be made, leading the police to treat individuals
as criminally suspect when, in fact, there is no well-founded reason. This
situation exists because the standard for intrusion is low. The lower the
standard, the greater the number of cases in which the intrusion carried
out will not prove to be warranted.134
Second, harassment is risked because the police can engage in these
fourth amendment intrusions abusively with little risk of accountabil-
ity. 13 5 The Court acknowledged this risk in Terry,136 and others have
since remarked on the risk.' 3 7 The low standard applied to the police
exercise of judgment creates great opportunity for arbitrary and abusive
exercise of discretion. The difficulty of judicial supervision, discussed be-
low, compounds the problem. A judicial check on that judgment is ap-
plied in only a small percentage of the cases and, then, after the fact, with
the circumstances reconstructed in the courtroom. Applying a sliding
scale to more intrusive actions, such as the arrest in Liaguno and the
detention in Chaidez, creates the risk that they, too, will be employed
abusively. The abuse, when it occurs, is apt to fall most heavily on the
least privileged members of society. 138 By inviting overuse of arrest and
133. 909 F.2d at 835.
134. See Maclin, Book Review, supra note 84, at 557. But see UVILLER, supra note 117, at 58-60.
135. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, § 9.1(e); Maclin, Book Review, supra note 84, at 569, 573 (em-
phasizing the likelihood that the exercise of discretion permitted will have a strong negative impact
on members of minority groups).
Interestingly, the absence of proof of abuse was noted by then Justice Rehnquist in his dissent-
ing opinion in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979): "Although such a system of discretionary
stops could conceivably be abused, the record before us contains no showing that such abuse is
probable or even likely." Id. at 667. When it occurs, abuse may be hard to prove. The litigation
culminating in the Supreme Court's decision in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1975), illustrates the
difficulty of establishing that police conduct has violated civil rights. See also City of Canton v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). It is unfortunate when constitutional protection is unavailable because
of a failure of proof.
136. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14.
137. See, e.g., Maclin, Decline of the Right of Locomotion, supra note 28.
138. See generally, Maclin, Decline of the Right of Locomotion, supra note 28; Schwartz, supra
note 86, at 446; Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214,
225-37 (1983); Margaret A. Lenzi, Comment, Reviewing Civilian Complaints of Police Misconduct-
Some Answers and More Questions, 48 TEMP. L.Q. 89, 108-09 (1974); RADELET, THE POLICE AND
THE COMMUNITY: STUDIES (1973); Strossen, supra note 28. See also State v. Kennedy, 247 N.J.
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near-arrest, not just stop and frisk, these cases threaten the security of
the individual against arbitrary police intrusion.
The Chaidez court based its reasoning in part on the Supreme Court
decisions upholding administrative searches and seizures.1 39 The
problems posed by seizures for criminal investigation are markedly dif-
ferent from fourth amendment issues raised by administrative
searches.140 For example, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab1 41 the Court approved testing federal employees for drugs in the
absence of any particularized suspicion. The searches conducted under
Von Raab will frequently invade the fourth amendment privacy of indi-
viduals whose lives raise no suggestion of wrongdoing. The Court ac-
knowledged that "all but a few of the employees tested are entirely
innocent.' 142 Administrative searches are almost by definition over-in-
clusive; they frequently invade the privacy of innocent individuals. In
contrast, the risk of focussing on an undeserving individual is lower in a
Terry interaction, because some level of suspicion is required. The risk is
nevertheless substantial, because the level of suspicion is so low.
Also, more error will be tolerated in administrative searches because
the circumstances and manner in which they are conducted reduces the
harm to fourth amendment interests. 143 An undeserved intrusion under
Chaidez effects greater harm. Because administrative searches are con-
cededly over-inclusive, the stigma of the seizure as well as the negative
subjective reaction it produces are less. The individual is treated with a
group concededly composed largely of non-offenders. 144 By contrast, in
the cases governed by Chaidez, the individual has been singled out for
criminal investigation. The disruption of fourth amendment interests
and personal debasement are consequently greater.145
In addition, administrative searches occur in a procedural frame-
work that assures regularity and lack of discretionary intrusion. The
Super. 21, 588 A.2d 834 (App. Div. 1991) (minority defendants who had been stopped on the high-
ways demonstrated that criminal prosecutions arising out of traffic stops fell disproportionately on
members of the minority group).
139. United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1195, 1197 (1990).
140. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth Amendment Rights of the Law-abiding
Public, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 87 (1989).
141. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
142. Id. at 674.
143. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 140, at 110 (administrative searches encompass a
broader group and consequently generate less stigma).
144. The Court has emphasized the expectation that administrative searches will generate less
negative subjective reaction. See, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444; Marti-
nez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 656. But see Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 664-67 (1979) (Rehnquist,
J. dissenting).
145. See Maclin, Book Review, supra note 84.
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Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed this aspect of the searches. 146 In
contrast to administrative searches, the types of interactions covered by
Chaidez entail the maximum play of discretion. The Chaidez approach
therefore represents a tremendous threat to the individual's security.
It is difficult to predict the limits of the court's new approach. In
Chaidez and Llaguno members of the court willingly expanded the bases
on which the government can justify fourth amendment intrusions by
adopting sliding scale standards. These decisions permit arrest on a
lower level of suspicion than ordinary probable cause and sub-arrest
seizure of the person if there is more than ordinary reasonable suspicion.
This balancing approach could logically be extended to permit more ex-
pansive Terry searches if the police had more suspicion than that usually
required. It could also extend to the lowest level of Terry seizure, per-
mitting justification at less than ordinary reasonable suspicion.
V. ELUSIVE REVIEW
Not only is a flexible standard hard for police to follow, it is also
hard for courts to police. Our system of supervision has deficiencies.
Many cases go unreviewed. The cases that receive judicial review give a
skewed picture of police responsibility. Moreover, if the courts apply a
deferential standard of review, the impact of judicial review is diminished
to the point of insignificance.
Courts generally review only criminal investigative stops that lead to
the discovery of evidence of crime. If the stop produces no evidence,
146. For example, in Martinez-Fuerte the court approved the practice of conducting checkpoint
stops without warrants. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566 (1976). The court
reasoned that one purpose of the warrant requirement is "to prevent hindsight from coloring the
evaluation of the reasonableness of a search or seizure." Id. at 565 (citation omitted). In the case of
checkpoint stops, however, the court did not anticipate such distortion because "It]he reasonableness
of checkpoint stops ... turns on factors such as the location and method of operation of the check-
point, factors that are not susceptible to the distortion of hindsight .. ." Id.; see also Michigan
Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (Court noted that guidelines governing checkpoint
operation minimize the discretion of the officers on the scene); National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 675 n.2 (1989) (citation omitted) (Court determined that the procedures
prescribed by the customs service [at a border checkpoint stop] ... do not carry the grave potential
for "arbitrary and oppressive interference with the privacy and personal security of individuals");
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1979)(citation omitted) (Court reversed defendant's conviction,
holding that when a stop is not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police
practices exceeds tolerable limits); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979) (court held that the
police acted unreasonably under the fourth amendment where they randomly stopped defendant's
vehicle to check the driver's license and the registration of the automobile, concluding that "It]his
kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the court has discerned when in previ-
ous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to
some extent"); Camara, 387 U.S. at 532 (Court concluded that requiring government officials to
obtain a search warrant from a neutral and detached magistrate minimizes the discretion of "the
official in the field ... precisely the discretion ... which we have consistently circumscribed ... ").
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only a civil suit alleging violation of individual rights will bring it to the
court's attention.t 47 Thus, both the number and the type of cases receiv-
ing judicial attention are unrepresentative of what occurs on the street.
The cases reviewed by the courts do not reflect the number of times
the police encroach on fourth amendment rights and find no evidence of
wrongdoing.' 48 Courts viewing this skewed picture respond to the need
for police authority it portrays rather than the abuse of individual rights
omitted from the picture. 149 This problem is likely to be greater when
the police action is less than an arrest. Arrests, often effected without a
warrant, suffer some of the problem of distortion of hindsight. However,
a higher percentage of arrests will be considered by the courts. The intru-
sion of an arrest signals an investigative interest in the defendant beyond
that signalled by a stop. Moreover, an arrest is a greater intrusion and
therefore may be more likely to lead to a civil suit if it is not supported by
sufficient evidence. The standards applied to arrests provide additional
protection; they are both better defined and significantly higher.
Adoption of a more flexible standard to govern a spectrum of inter-
mediate police-individual interactions heightens these problems. It
leaves more to police discretion. It generates more opportunity for un-
supported stops to lead to fruitless intrusions on fourth amendment
rights. For the same reasons, the more flexible rule makes it harder for
an aggrieved individual to make out a case for civil relief on grounds of a
fourth amendment violation. It makes it less likely that appellate deci-
sions will provide meaningful guidance to the courts or the police.
The standard of review applied to determinations of fourth amend-
ment issues will also affect the impact of a flexible rule. The law defining
the standard of review applied to fourth amendment questions is cur-
rently in a state of flux. In Chaidez, the court noted that the standard of
review is "in transition."' 50 The courts of appeals addressing the ques-
tion are not in agreement. Apparently, the majority still engages in de
novo review of warrantless action raising fourth amendment issues. 15'
147. See sources cited supra note 114.
148. See Cloud, supra note 81 (one cannot use criminal cases alone to evaluate the accuracy of
the drug courier profile "for they are inevitably skewed in favor of the profile."). But see UVILLER,
supra note 117 (expressing belief that at least some officers have a very high rate of success). See also
HIRSCHEL, supra note 114, at note 71 (discussing perceptions concerning "productive and unproduc-
tive police searches").
149. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, established in United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897 (1984), can be seen as reflecting such a response. See also United States v. Leon-Reyna, 930
F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1991) (stop upheld under good faith exception even though officer's suspicion
rested on information that was erroneous due to the officer's own negligence).
150. Chaidez, 919 F.2d at 1196.
151. See United States v. Montilla, 928 F.2d 583, 588 n.2 (2d Cir. 1991) (reviewing de novo the
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Some judges, however, advocate a more deferential standard-a "clearly
erroneous" standard to be applied to warrantless actions as well as ac-
tions based on warrants. 15 2 The standard of review can compound the
difficulties presented by the adoption of a flexible fourth amendment
standard. If the court applies a de novo standard and exercises its judg-
ment with protective scrutiny, the police are likely to feel frustrated by
the lack of a standard to protect them against the hazard of judicial sec-
ond-guessing. More likely, however, the pattern will be that identified by
Professor Amsterdam: "appellate courts defer to trial courts and trial
courts defer to the police."' 153 A deferential standard encourages that
result, tending to leave definition of the standard to an interested party-
law enforcement.
A deferential standard generates other serious problems. Uniform-
ity of result, already difficult to achieve under a flexible standard, is more
elusive. The appellate decisions will provide almost no guidance. The
appellate process will leave the lower courts free to interpret the standard
except when they are clearly wrong. The police will likely have inconsis-
tent precedent from the lower courts, inadequately guiding their on-the-
street judgment calls. The result is far from precise fourth amendment
protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Chaidez, building on the plurality opinion in Llaguno, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit introduced a more flexible test for
assessing the constitutionality of seizures of the person that are more in-
trusive than a usual Terry stop but less intrusive than a full arrest. The
court advanced a sliding scale, ad hoc balancing test. In applying the
test, the primary pertinent question is whether the seizure of the person
was reasonable given the level of suspicion the police officer possessed.
question of whether there has been a seizure of the person under the fourth amendment); United
States v. Maragh, 894 F.2d 415, 417-18 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 214 (1990); United
States v. Kerr, 817 F. 2d 1384, 1386 (9th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064
(7th Cir. 1990) (reviewing de novo the question of whether probable cause to arrest existed); United
States v. Jaramillo, 891 F.2d 620, 626 (7th Cir. 1989) (reviewing de novo the question of whether
police had reasonable suspicion to justify investigatory stop of defendant).
152. See United States v. Jefferson, 906 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1990) (reviewing by a clearly
erroneous standard the question of whether, under the fourth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution, a seizure of the person occurred); United States v. Teslim, 869 F.2d 316, 321 (7th Cir.
1989); United States v. Gray, 883 F.2d 320, 322 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d
1490, 1495 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. West, 651 F.2d 71, 74 (ist Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1188 (1985); see also United States v. Edwards, 898 F.2d 1273, 1276 (7th Cir. 1990) (reviewing
district court's denial of a motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard).
153. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
394 (1974).
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This test is more flexible than the tests developed by the Supreme Court.
The test's flexibility threatens fourth amendment rights. The Supreme
Court has already moved dangerously far in the direction of adopting
flexible fourth amendment standards. The Chaidez test goes even farther
in that direction. If the test is employed, it will impede consistency of
result. Under such a test, judicial action has no useful value as precedent
either to guide other courts or to guide on-the-street police behavior.
The net effect of a move to such an extremely flexible test is to put pro-
tection of fourth amendment rights in the discretion of the police. In the
guise of precise analysis, the court has enuciated a test that would gut
fourth amendment protection against investigative seizures. The court
should abandon the Chaidez test and continue to effect fourth amend-
ment protection within the better defined framework already established
by the Supreme Court.
